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Abstract—Multiple probabilistic packet marking (PPM) schemes
for IP traceback have been proposed to deal with Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by reconstructing their attack
graphs and identifying the attack sources.
In this paper, ten PPM-based IP traceback schemes are
compared and analyzed in terms of features such as convergence
time, performance evaluation, underlying topologies, incremental
deployment, re-marking, and upstream graph. Our analysis
shows that the considered schemes exhibit a significant discrep-
ancy in performance as well as performance assessment. We
concisely demonstrate this by providing a table showing that
(a) different metrics are used for many schemes to measure their
performance and, (b) most schemes are evaluated on different
classes of underlying network topologies.
Our results reveal that both the value and arrangement of
the PPM-based scheme convergence times vary depending on
exactly the underlying network topology. As a result, this paper
shows that a side-by-side comparison of the scheme performance
a complicated and turns out to be a crucial open problem in this
research area.
Index Terms—IP traceback, network security, distributed de-
nial of service (DDoS), probabilistic packet marking (PPM)
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Protocol (IP) traceback is a method to deal with
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [1], [2]. Using
IP traceback, sources of attack traffic can be identified from
the network traffic they generate. A prominent IP traceback
technique for identification of flooding style DDoS attacks
is Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM). In PPM-based IP
traceback, network routers embed their own identities in
packets randomly selected from all the network traffic that
the routers process [3]. In the event of an attack, the routers’
identity markings present in the attack packets can be used
to reconstruct the attack graph — the paths taken by attack
traffic — and establish its sources [4], [5]. The technique
of probabilistically marking packets for IP traceback is the
basis of many schemes hereafter referred to as PPM-based
schemes [4], [6], [7], [8]. Multiple additional schemes have
been proposed with the purpose to increase the efficiency of
PPM-based schemes [6], [8], [9], [10].
Tracing the paths of IP packets back to their origin, known
as IP traceback, is an important step in defending against DoS
attacks employing IP spoofing. IP traceback facilitates holding
attackers accountable and improving the efficacy of mitigation
measures. The existing approaches for IP traceback can be
grouped into two orthogonal dimensions: packet marking and
packet logging. The main idea behind packet marking is to
record network path information in packets. In mark based IP
traceback, routers write their identification information (e.g.,
IP addresses) into a header field of forwarded packets. The
destination node then retrieves the marking information from
the received packets and determines the network path. Due to
the limited space of the marking field, routers probabilistically
decide to mark packets so that each marked packet carries
only partial path information. The network path can be con-
structed by combining the marking information collected from
a number of received packets. This approach is also known
as probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [3]. PPM incurs little
overhead at routers. However, it requires a flow of marked
packets to construct the network path toward their origin.
In this paper, we present a concise network-centric analysis
of a selected set of PPM-based schemes. Ten PPM-based
schemes are compared in terms of features such as conver-
gence time, the metrics, underlying topologies, incremental
deployment, re-marking, and upstream graph. These schemes
are PPM [3], AMS [4], PPM-NPC [11], TMS [12], FIT [6],
RPPM [7], TPM [8], Randomize-and-link [9], IDPPM [10],
and PBS [13]. The schemes considered therein are by no
means an exhaustive study of all the PPM-based schemes in
existence. However, the collection of schemes is large enough
to show the discrepancy in both the metrics and underlying
topologies as well as the inadequacy of the topologies that
make their direct comparison difficult [14], [15].
Thus, this paper shows that the direct performance compari-
son of the schemes is complicated or not feasible at all. As our
analysis show the reasons for this is (a) many schemes utilize
different metrics to measure their performance and, (b) the
many schemes are simulated on different kinds of underlying
network topologies, the majority of which do not provide an
adequate abstraction of the topology of the Internet or focus
on different characteristics of it [7], [11], [12].
In detail, the underlying topologies are typically tree-
structured with a single path from an attacker to the victim. In
contrast, the topology of the Internet exhibits alternative routes
that make it both resilient and scalable. Both the disparity in
metrics and underlying topologies, as well as the inadequacy of
the topologies, raise questions about the performances of these
schemes in the Internet and the comparability between them.
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Figure 1. Internet topology can be captured by a variety of models which
include spatial, structural and degree-based models. Each model emphasizes
different properties of the Internet and can be used to evaluate network
protocols when employed in the Internet. The nodes in these topologies
represent devices operating at the Internet layer of the TCP/IP model or the
network layer of the OSI model (e.g. routers, switches, hosts). Two nodes are
connected by an edge if Internet traffic can be directly transmitted between
them without being forwarded by any intermediate nodes.
This shows that there is a need to evaluate and compare the
schemes on common and appropriate networks. The results of
this evaluation can then be used to determine which schemes
are the most promising candidates for Internet deployment.
In summary, the contribution of this paper is threefold: (a)
an analysis of PPM-based schemes is presented, (b) providing
a taxonomy for PPM-based IP traceback schemes, and (c) an
analytical model to argue that different underlying topologies
inhibit a direct comparison between the performance of the
PPM-based schemes.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Related
work, in which the selected set of PPM-based protocols is
discussed, is presented in Section II. The analysis of PPM-
based schemes as well as additional background is presented
in Section III, including considerations on definitions, metrics,
and underlying topologies. The theory and system model be-
hind our work is analyzed in Section IV. We discuss outcomes
of this paper and conclude in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe and discuss a set of PPM-based
IP traceback schemes for which we will provide an analysis
in Section III.
PPM-based schemes consist of a marking scheme and a
reconstruction procedure, and are based on the assumption
that large amounts of traffic are used in a (D)DoS attack
[3]. In their original work, Savage et al. [3] propose that
the PPM marking scheme is employed at all times in all the
routers in the network, while the reconstruction procedure is
employed by the victim in the event of an attack. The marking
scheme ensures that every router embeds its own identity in
packets randomly selected from the packets the routers process
during routing. Since a large number of packets is received
in an attack, there is a considerable chance that a victim
will have received packets with markings from all the routers
that were traversed by the attack packets. The victim then
employs the reconstruction procedure which uses the received
marked attack packets to map out the attack graph — the
paths from the victim to the attackers. The total number of
received packets required to trace the attackers is referred to
as the scheme’s convergence time.
Multiple PPM-based schemes have since been introduced.
One example is the Tabu Marking Scheme (TMS) [12]. The
author points out that PPM is prone to information loss as
a result of re-marking. Re-marking occurs when a router ran-
domly selects a packet which already has marking information
from an upstream router, and consequently overwrites this
information. TMS tackles this problem by ensuring that their
marking scheme forfeits the marking opportunity in the event
that the randomly selected packet contains previous marking
information. As a result, they report lower convergence times
than PPM for DDoS attacks.
Another example is the Prediction Based Scheme (PBS)
which also avoids re-marking [13]. However, in contrast
to TMS, the PBS marking scheme ensures that the router
information is embedded in the next available packet if the
randomly selected packet already has marking information.
The PBS marking scheme requires extra space cost of 1 bit
compared to PPM. Additionally, the reconstruction procedure
utilizes both legitimate and attack traffic to reconstruct the
attack graph.
Wong et al. [7] present Rectified Probabilistic Packet Mark-
ing (RPPM). They point out that the reconstruction procedure
used in PPM [3] and Advanced and Authenticated Marking
schemes (AMS) [4] has an imprecise termination condition.
They present a precise termination condition that enables
complete attack graph reconstruction within a user-specified
level of confidence.
Multiple additional schemes have been proposed with the
purpose to increase the efficiency of PPM [6], [8], [9], [10].
Some of these schemes are analyzed in Table I. The table
compares ten PPM-based schemes in terms of features such
as convergence time, the metrics, underlying topologies, in-
cremental deployment, re-marking, and upstream graph. The
schemes considered therein are by no means an exhaustive
study of all the PPM-based schemes, but the selection of
schemes is large enough to show the discrepancy in both the
metrics and underlying topologies as well as the inadequacy
of the topologies that make their direct comparison difficult.
The feature incremental deployment refers to whether the
scheme would be successful if the marking scheme is deployed
on a fraction of the routers in the network. Only a few schemes
explicitly state that they would be successful when partially
deployed [3], [4], [6], [9].
Re-marking refers to whether the marking scheme at a router
permits the overwriting of previous edge or router information
in a packet. The majority of the considered schemes permit
re-marking of packets [3], [4], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
Upstream graph refers to whether a scheme requires a
previously obtained map of the network to successfully trace
the specific path taken by attack traffic. Some of the works
address how such a map can be obtained to aid in attack graph
reconstruction [4], [6], [13].
Other features such as metrics, convergence time, and un-
derlying topology are discussed in subsequent sections.
It is important to point out that PPM-based schemes are
not the only proposed approaches to IP traceback [1], [2].
Alternatives include packet logging [16], specialized routing
[17], Internet control message protocol (ICMP) traceback
[18], deterministic packet marking [19] and hybrid approaches
which combine different traceback techniques [20], or com-
bine traceback with anomaly detection [21].
III. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section, an analysis of the discussed PPM-based
schemes from Section II is provided. This section is catego-
rized according to definitions and expressions,
A. Definitions and expressions
The performance of traceback schemes is commonly mea-
sured by the convergence time, also known as the reconstruc-
tion time. The convergence time is defined as the total number
of received packets required by the reconstruction procedure
to return the complete attack graph [3]. The convergence time
is dependent on the marked packet distribution P , the number
of attackers n, and attack graph G as below.
Definition 1 (Convergence time). The convergence time C is
defined as C = f(Pi, n,G) where G(v, e) is a graph made
up of a set v of nodes and a set e of edges on which M is
implemented.
Definition 2 (Attack path length). The attack path length d
is the number of edges (hops) that the attack traffic traverses
between an attacker A and the victim V .
Definition 3 (Marked packet distribution). The marked packet
distribution Pi is described as the marked packets received by
the victim from the ith attacker Ai given i ∈ [1, n] where n
is the number of attackers. We define Pi = f(p, d,M) as it
depends on the marking probability p, the marking scheme
M , and attack path length d.
An alternative measure of the performance of a traceback
scheme is the correctness of the attack graph Gret that the
reconstruction procedure returns when compared to the actual
attack graph Gact.
This is especially important in marking schemes where the
router IP address is broken into fragments because of space
constraints in the packet header as in [3], [4], [6], [8]. In
these works, a fragment of the router’s IP address, instead of
the entire address, is transmitted in the packet header, which
requires an extra function of combining the fragments during
the reconstruction procedure. This introduces the possibility of
incorrect recombination where fragments from routers in Gact
are combined to identify an innocent router in G′act, whereby
G′ refers to the complement of G, as being part of Gret.
Ideally, the returned attack graph should be identical to the
actual attack graph, i.e. Gret = Gact.
Definition 4 (False positives). False positives are nodes in-
correctly identified as belonging to the attack graph. Given
an attack graph Gact and a reconstructed attack graph Gret,
the false positives are identified as all members of the set
{Gret ∩G
′
act}.
Definition 5 (False negatives). False negatives are nodes
in the attack graph that are not identified as such by the
reconstruction procedure. Given an attack graph Gact and
a reconstructed attack graph Gret, the false negatives are
identified as all members of the set {Gact ∩G′ret}.
The expressions for convergence time shown in Table I
are the analytical bounds for C = f(d, p) given G is the
Single Path, Single attacker (SP/SA) topology and the recon-
struction procedure has no prior knowledge of the underlying
topology. The SP/SA topology occurs when all the attack
traffic originates from a single source and takes the same
path to the victim. The convergence time expressions shown
in Table I are derived using the coupon collector’s problem
[22]. In randomize-and-link [9], l is the number of fragments
that each router splits its address into, and Hnl is the nlth
harmonic number. The schemes in [4], [6], [8], [10] do not
provide mathematical modeling of their convergence times in
the SP/SA topology.
Savage et al. [3] and Tseng et al. [11] point out that the
ideal marking probability p depends on the attack path length
d. In PPM [3], the marking probability is p = 0.04. This value
of p is based on the report that the path length d ≤ 25 for most
Internet paths [23]. This value of p is maintained in AMS [4],
TMS [12], RPPM [7], and PBS [13].
Wong et al. [7] present a reconstruction procedure in which
they count the number of packets required to construct a
fully connected attack graph, and then count extra packets to
guarantee with a certain level of confidence that all edges in
the attack graph are in fact accounted for. To ensure uniformity
across the schemes considered in our simulations, we use a
simplified version of their reconstruction procedure in which
the number of packets required to account for all edges in the
complete attack path is counted.
A large variety of graphs are used as the underlying topolo-
gies in the considered protocol performance analysis. The
majority of uses tree-structured graphs Gtree = {v, e; |v| =
|e|+ 1} [3], [7], [11], [12], [9], [13].
B. Metrics
In this section, we describe the metrics used in the con-
sidered PPM-based schemes (as shown in Tables I and II) in
terms of the definitions given in the preceding section.
1) Convergence time metrics: The convergence time C is
the fundamental measure of the speed and success of any
Table I
A COMPREHENSIVE COMPARISON OF PPM-BASED IP TRACEBACK SCHEMES SHOWING THE VARIETY OF METRICS EMPLOYED, AND THE TOPOLOGIES
USED FOR THE EVALUATION OF THOSE SCHEMES. THE TABLE PROVIDES A COMPARISON OF 10 DIFFERENT PPM-BASED SCHEMES OVER THEIR
FEATURES. THESE FEATURES INCLUDE convergence time, metrics USED FOR EVALUATION OF THE SCHEMES, WHETHER THEY REQUIRE PRIOR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE upstream graph TO CORRECTLY IDENTIFY ATTACKERS, WHETHER THEY CAN BE incrementally deployed, AND underlying topology.
THE CONVERGENCE TIME EXPRESSIONS PRESENTED IN THE TABLE ARE FOR A DOS SCENARIO ASSUMING NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE NETWORK
TOPOLOGY WHILE THE UNDERLYING TOPOLOGY SHOWS THE NETWORK TOPOLOGIES USED IN THE EVALUATION OF THE SCHEMES. THESE TOPOLOGIES
INCLUDE single path, single attacker (SP/SA), single path, multiple attacker (SP/MA), AND multiple paths, multiple attacker (MP/MA). THE METRICS
SHOWN IN THIS TABLE ARE DESCRIBED IN TABLE II
Scheme Year Convergence time Metrics Incrementaldeployment Re-marking
Upstream
graph Underlying topology
PPM [3] 2001 ≤ ln(d)
p(1−p)d−1
1 yes yes no SP/SA (max. 30 hops)
AMS [4] 2001 undetermined 1,4,5 yes yes yes Traceroute data set (103402 destina-tions, 2000 attackers)
PPM-NPC [11] 2004 ≤ ln(d)+0.58
p
7 no no no SP/SA (10 hops)
TMS [12] 2005 ≤ ln(d)
p(1−p)d−1
1,2 no no yes Binary tree (6 hops, 32 sources)
FIT [6] 2005 undetermined 1,3,6 yes yes yes Skitter map (174409 hosts, 5000 attack-
ers)
RPPM [7] 2008 < ln(d)
p(1−p)d−1
5,10,11,12 no yes no SP/SA, binary tree, random tree net-
work (15, 100, 500, 1000 nodes)
TPM [8] 2008 undetermined 1,4,8,9 no yes yes Skitter data (avg. 18 hops)
Randomize-and-link
[9] 2008 <
nlHnl
p(1−p)d−1
7,11,12 yes yes no Binary tree (10 hops)
IDPPM [10] 2010 undetermined 12,13 no yes no SP/SA (20-32 hops)
PBS [13] 2012 ≤ ln(d)
p
1,2,7 no no yes/no SP/SA, SP/MA, MP/MA, 50 node net-
work, 100 node network
PPM-based scheme and it is dependent on many factors. A
variety of metrics has been used to measure this dependence
with respect to these various factors.
Convergence time versus attack path length shows how C
varies with d. This is normally done for a simple topology
Gtree, with n = 1 but is done for larger values of n in [4],
[12], [7], [8], [13].
Convergence time versus number of attackers is a measure
of how C varies with n for a specified G. This metric is
considered in [7], [9], [13], [11].
Convergence time versus marking probability is used by
Wong et al. [7] to investigate the relationship between C and
marking probability p for a topology Gtree, where n = 1,
d = 3 and show that large p values actually increase the
convergence time while very low p values result in large values
of P ′i . This relationship is investigated by Goodrich [9] for
Gtree, n = 1000, d = 10. He finds that the ideal marking
probability is pideal ≈ 1d .
Convergence time versus number of routers is a descrip-
tion of the relationship between convergence time C and
the size |v| of a given graph G. This metric is used in
[9] for |v| ∈ {50, 100, 250, 500, 1000}, in [7] for |v| ∈
{15, 50, 100, 500, 1000}, and in [10] for |v| ∈ [3, 30].
Reconstruction time in seconds versus the number of at-
tackers is used in [4] to measure the variation of C with n.
However, C is translated from packets to time in seconds.
As a result, this metric is dependent on the system on which
the victim is running the reconstruction procedure, as well
as the bandwidth and latency of the topology on which the
simulation is being carried out. In [7], the authors investigate
the relationship between reconstruction time in seconds and
the number of nodes |v| in the attack graph.
2) False positive and false negative metrics: Some re-
searchers have investigated the various factors that affect the
accuracy of the traceback process.
False positives versus false negatives is a measure of how
|{Gret ∩ G
′
act}| varies with |{Gact ∩ G′ret}|. This form of
a Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) is used to evaluate the
scheme in [6].
False positive versus number of attackers investigates the
variation of the number of false positives |{Gret ∩ G′act}|,
with n for G = Gtree. This is considered in [4], [8].
False negative versus number of packets shows how the false
negatives |{Gact ∩ G′ret}| vary with the number of received
packets without any false positives. This plot is used in [6]
with n = 100 to show that the accuracy improves with an
increase in received packets.
3) Additional metrics: There are additional metrics that
do not fall into the convergence time, or false positive and
false negative categories. These metrics are generally used
to understand the extra dynamics involved in the traceback
process.
Fraction of distinct markings versus number of attackers
measures the proportion of Pi with distinct markings as a
function of n at a given value of d. This metric is used in
[8].
Number of marked packets versus distance from victim is a
description of the distribution of Pi. It shows how Pi varies
with router distance l, where l ∈ [0, d]. This was evaluated for
Gtree with n ∈ {1, 32} in [12], and with n ∈ {1, 3, 5} in [13].
Probability that a packet is unmarked versus path length
is used in [8] to show the variation of P ′i with d for M ∈
Table II
THIS TABLE SHOWS METRICS USED IN THE CONSIDERED PPM-BASED
SCHEMES AND THEIR INDICES FROM TABLE I.
Index Metric definition
1 Convergence time vs. attack path length
2 Number of marked packets vs. distance from victim
3 False positives vs. false negatives
4 False positives vs. number of attackers
5 Reconstruction time in seconds vs. number of attackers
6 False negatives vs. number of packets
7 Convergence time vs. number of attackers
8 Fraction of distinct markings vs. number of attackers
9 Probability a packet is unmarked vs. path length
10 Successful rate vs. traceback confidence level
11 Convergence time vs. marking probability
12 Convergence time vs. number of routers
13 Overhead on routers vs. number of nodes
{PPM,TPM}.
Successful rate versus traceback confidence level is used
by Wong et al. [7]. They present a reconstruction procedure
that uses a traceback confidence level to determine when to
halt the traceback process. They present this metric, which is a
measure of how the proportion of times {Gret = Gact|Gact =
Gtree, n = 1, d = 3} varies with the traceback confidence
level for p ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
Overhead on routers versus number of nodes is used in [10]
to show the overhead cost on the routers as a function of the
number of nodes |v| in the attack graph G. The overhead on
the routers is measured in terms of the number of markings
performed.
In summary, Tables I and II expose the large number of met-
rics that are used to measure the performance of the mentioned
PPM-based schemes. Coupled with the differing settings used
to test these metrics, this makes direct comparison of different
schemes problematic.
C. Categories of PPM schemes
Despite their large number, PPM-based schemes have sim-
ilar underlying algorithms in their marking schemes. The
underlying algorithm is responsible for how the packets in
which the router identities are embedded are selected. For
example, the majority of the considered schemes exhibit
underlying algorithms in which all routers randomly select
packets with equal probability p [3], [4], [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10]. The schemes in this category are prone to re-marking. We
refer to this category as the re-marking category of PPM-based
schemes. In the other category of schemes, the routers’ packet
selection process is only partially random. The underlying
algorithms in this category prohibit the overwriting of previous
router information and as a result exhibit performances that are
notably different from the re-marking category [12], [13], [11].
We select three representative marking schemes: PPM [3]
to represent the re-marking category, and TMS [12] and PBS
[13] to represent the non-re-marking category. The analytical
models for these three schemes are markedly different from
each other, even for equal marking probability, because of the
differences in the schemes’ underlying marking algorithms.
The performance of any PPM-based scheme can therefore be
compared to either one of these schemes, or a combination of
them.
Because of re-marking in PPM, the victim typically receives
more markings from close-by routers than from distant routers.
The chance of receiving a marked packet from a router l hops
away is given by the geometric distribution expression p(1−
p)l−1. This is because a received marked packet indicates that
that packet was selected by a router (with probability p), and
not selected (with probability 1 − p) by all l − 1 subsequent
routers. The analysis for PPM can therefore be applied to any
scheme where the markings from distant routers are rarer than
markings from close-by routers.
In TMS, the decision to forfeit a marking opportunity if the
packet is previously marked means that markings from routers
distant from the victim are more prevalent than markings from
closer routers. The chance of receiving a marked packet from a
router l hops away is given by p(1−p)d−l where d is the attack
path length. This is because a received marked packet indicates
that that packet was selected by a router (with probability p),
after not being selected (with probability 1 − p) by all d− l
previous routers. This analysis can be applied to all schemes in
which markings from distant routers are more prevalent than
markings from close-by routers.
In contrast to TMS, the PBS marking scheme compensates
for the missed marking opportunities. Therefore the chance
of receiving a marking from a router l hops from the victim
is given by p for any router in the path. This analysis can
be applied to all schemes in which the markings from the
routers are equally prevalent regardless of their distance from
the victim.
These three schemes therefore provide an adequate basis
to understand the impact of the network topology on other
PPM-based schemes.
D. Underlying topologies
The performance of a PPM-based traceback scheme should
be evaluated on the Internet itself. However, because of the
very large-scale dynamic and heterogeneous structure of the
Internet attempts to carry out empirical protocol evaluation are
expensive and inflexible [24]. As a result, researchers resort
to simulations implemented on underlying topologies which
are considered to be simplified abstractions of the topology
of the Internet [24], [25], [26], [27]. An underlying topology
is represented by a graph G(v, e) consisting of nodes v and
edges e where the nodes represent either devices with routing
capability or end hosts. An edge between any two nodes
means that traffic can be directly transmitted between those
two devices (cf. Fig. 1) [24].
As shown in Table I, a variety of underlying topologies
have been used to evaluate the performance of PPM-based
schemes. During set up, the marking algorithm is implemented
in the nodes (routers) in the graph. To simulate the attack,
packets are transmitted from one or more nodes (representing
the attackers) to one specific node (representing the victim). A
reconstruction procedure is then implemented at the victim to
map out the attack graph Gact. The attack graph consists of all
nodes and edges in the underlying topology that were directly
involved in transmitting the attack packets. The underlying
topologies used in PPM-based schemes range from simplistic
to complex.
The single path, single attacker (SP/SA) is a simple topol-
ogy consisting of a single attacker node sending packets along
a single identical path to a single victim node. The length of
the path varies with each work ranging from 3 hops to 32
hops [3], [7], [13], [11]. This setup is used to simulate the
performance of PPM schemes during a flooding style DoS
attack.
The Single Path, Multiple Attacker (SP/MA), and Multiple
Paths, Multiple Attacker (MP/MA) topologies consist of mul-
tiple sources of attack traffic to simulate a DDoS attack. The
SP/MA simulates a unique topology in which all the attackers
are located at different distances from the victim but all along
a single identical path [13]. The MP/MA simulates a more
general topology where each attacker has a unique path linking
it to the victim node. In some cases, the paths are completely
independent [7], while in other cases, the paths merge closer
to the victim [12], [7], [9], [13].
One unique MP/MA topology is a tree, e.g. a binary tree. In
this case, the attack graph is modeled as a tree with some or
all the leaves at a certain depth representing the attack nodes,
and the root of the tree representing the victim node [12], [7],
[9]. This setup ensures that different attack paths merge the
closer they are to the victim. As with SP/SA and SP/MA, there
is only one path in the attack graph from an attack node to
the victim node.
Schemes such as AMS, FIT, and TPM have been evaluated
using actual data sets from the Internet [4], [6], [8] including
traceroute data sets from Lucent Bell labs [4] and CAIDA’s
skitter map [6], [8]. These data sets are used to produce
topologies that are typically larger than the simple topologies
mentioned thus far and provide better abstractions of the
Internet structure. However, they do not provide an adequate
description of the Internet since they are typically restricted
to restricted snapshot of the Internet network [16]. Traceroute
datasets have also been reported to be inaccurate when the
network has asymmetric paths [6].
One common feature with these underlying topologies is
their tree-like structure. A tree-structured topology Gtree ex-
hibits a single path from any given attacker to the victim. The
choice of tree-structured topologies is based on the assumption
that all attack traffic from one attacker will take the same
path to the victim. This assumption is in turn based on the
observation that Internet paths are largely invariant particularly
over short periods of time [28]. These assumptions have
allowed researchers to simplify the simulation process by
ignoring the routing capabilities of the network and enforcing
a predefined set of paths for attack traffic as evidenced in
a tree-structured topology. However, because tree-structured
topologies do not exhibit the alternative routes ubiquitous in
the Internet, they can not be used as an appropriate abstraction
of the Internet topology.
In summary, network models used to simulate the Internet
topology fall into three categories based on the properties that
they emphasize, namely degree-based models, structural mod-
els and spatial models (cf. Fig. 1). The emphasis of degree-
based models is the degree distribution of the nodes in an
attempt to recreate the power law observations in the Internet
[26], [29]. The structural models arrange the nodes to mimic
the hierarchical structure of the Internet, with Internet traffic
being transmitted through routers located within autonomous
systems [24], [27]. The spatial models place emphasis on the
location of the nodes with any two nodes being connected only
if they are within a transmission range of each other [30].
IV. TOPOLOGY INFLUENCE ANALYSIS: A
DEMONSTRATION
In the last part, we argued that the comparison of perfor-
mance results is difficult because the underlying topologies
used are fundamentally different. Here, an analytical basis
is given that shows how subtle differences in the network
topologies contribute to differences between the convergence
times of the PPM-based schemes.
The convergence time for PPM-based schemes has been
originally modeled as the coupon-collector’s problem [22], [3].
A coupon collector seeks to collect d equally likely distinct
coupons by drawing them from an urn with replacement.
While it takes a short time to get the first few unique coupons,
it takes considerably longer to get the last few coupons that
complete the entire collection. The expected number of turns
needed to draw all d distinct coupons grows as Θ(d · ln(d))
[22].
When the coupon collector problem is applied to packet
marking, the marked packets are considered to be the coupons.
For example, Fig. 2(a) shows a single path linking attacker A
to victim I and the target of the “coupon collector” would
be to collect markings for all 7 edges. However, the expected
time expression above must be modified to apply them to the
packet marking problem because one may or may not “draw” a
marked packet in the packet marking problem and the marked
packets have unequal chances of being received. Savage et al.
[3] deal with the unequal edge probabilities by utilizing the
probability of the least likely edge to provide an upper bound
on the expected convergence time.
Formally, given a single path of l hops implementing the
PPM scheme with router marking probability p, the least likely
edge is typically the edge located closest to the attacker which
has a probability p(1− p)l−1 of being received by the victim.
Given d unique markings, the probability of receiving any
marking at the victim is therefore at least dp(1− p)l−1 which
is the product of the number of unique markings and the
probability of the least likely edge. The expected number of
packets E[x] required to complete the marking “collection”
in order to build the attack graph is derived by dividing the
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Figure 2. Sample attack paths linking attacker A to victim I. The attack path
in Fig. b exhibits Subgraph 4 in which the traffic can either take path FGI
with probability a, or path FHI with probability 1− a.
original coupon collector expectation by dp(1 − p)l−1 which
yields [3].
E0,PPM [x] <
ln(d)
p(1− p)l−1
(1)
Therefore, the final expression for the upper bound of the
expected convergence time is obtained by dividing the natural
logarithm of the number of distinct edges d, by the probability
p(1− p)l−1 of the least likely edge in the attack path. For the
SP/SA topology, the number of hops is equal to the number
of unique markings (l = d).
In Fig. 2(a), the least likely edge is AB with a probability
of p(1−p)l−1. However, the probability of receiving edge FG
in Fig. 2(b) is given by ap(1− p) which is considerably less
than the probability of AB for short path lengths. In this case,
the convergence time is given by Equation 2.
E1,PPM [x] <
ln(d)
ap(1− p)
(2)
Comparing Equation 1 and Equation 2 reveals that the con-
vergence time is increased by a factor of (1−p)
l−2
a
. This
means that even in the best case when both alternative paths
are equally likely (a = 0.5), the convergence time of a 3-
hop attack graph is multiplied by a factor of 1.92 while
a 15 hop attack graph is multiplied by a factor of 1.18.
If one of the two paths only carries a tenth of the traffic
(a = 0.1), the convergence times of the 3-hop and 15-hop
attack graphs are multiplied by a factor of 9.6 and 5.88
respectively. Additionally, the alternative paths factor affects
short attack paths more than long attack paths.
The cases for TMS and PBS are similar. It can be shown
that for TMS and PBS the convergence time is increased by
a factor of 1
a
regardless of the path length.
This shows that alternative paths reduce the probability of
the least likely edges in an attack path for all the considered
schemes, and consequently increases their convergence times.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, ten PPM-based IP traceback schemes are
compared and analyzed. Although, it is a non-exhaustive
study, the number of schemes is sufficiently representative to
show existing discrepancies in performance and performance
evaluation between the schemes.
As a result of this analysis, it becomes comprehensive why
a direct comparison of PPM-based schemes turns out to be
a prohibitively complicated undertaken. The reasons for this:
Firstly, most schemes utilize different metrics to measure their
performance. Secondly, many schemes are evaluated on dif-
ferent kinds of underlying network topologies, the majority of
which do not provide an adequate abstraction of the topology
of the Internet or focus on different characteristics of it.
The underlying topologies are typically tree-structured with
a single path from an attacker to the victim. In contrast, the
topology of the Internet exhibits alternative routes that make
it both resilient and scalable. Both the disparity in metrics
and underlying topologies, as well as the inadequacy of the
topologies, raise questions about the performances of these
schemes in the Internet. For example, which scheme would
perform best when deployed on an appropriate network—a
network similar to the Internet? Does the performance of a
PPM-based scheme vary with the network on which it is
implemented? If so, is it possible to provide a common ground
for comparing scheme performance when the schemes are
implemented on different networks? These questions show
that there is a need to evaluate and compare the schemes
on common and appropriate networks. The results of this
evaluation can then be used to determine which schemes are
the most promising candidates for Internet deployment.
The work presented herein has implications that reach out-
side the field of IP traceback. For example, do other network
protocols also display a dependence on the network topology
exhibited by the network on which they are implemented? If
so, can these dependencies be exploited to yield better protocol
performance in specific types of networks? These questions
should encourage multiple topology evaluations of network
protocols.
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